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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and background 
The purpose of this assignment was to develop a proof of concept based on certain 
limitations and regulations that the assigner is obligated to comply with. These 
requirements and regulations are based on the Finnish National Security Auditing 
Criteria (KATAKRI). Fulfilling these requirements creates a challenge on how to deal 
with certain administrative processes and how to implement the security controls in 
practice, while keeping the organization’s business needs as effective as possible. 
Earlier research on this kind of practical implementation against Windows 
workstations did not exist. 
Microsoft has stated that new PC chipsets produced by major manufacturers will 
only be supported on Windows 10 and not the earlier Windows versions (Myerson, 
2016). As the organizations using older Windows versions have to renew their PC 
equipment at some point, this leaves no other choice than to move to the Windows 
10 platform as well. This lead the assignment to focus on using Windows 10 and its 
new security features to address modern world security threats.  
One of the requirements set by the assigner was that the implementation shall be 
done in an environment that does not have an Internet connection available at all, 
thus, using an operating system heavily dependent on Internet facing cloud services 
could be a challenge. Offline environments without a real-time cloud protection do 
not have the same protection level as the with a working Internet connection. On the 
other hand, offline environment does not have the same attack surface compared to 
the ones connected to the Internet.  
1.2 Scope and objectives 
The scope of thesis consisted of creating practical implementations on how Windows 
10 operating system enhanced with additional technologies could fulfill end-user 
workstation related requirements defined in KATAKRI auditing criteria in practice. 
Besides fulfilling the requirements, another objective was to create working 
administrative processes for ways to maintain the implemented security controls. 
9 
 
 
As the assigner had already made some technology choices for anti-malware and 
Windows configuration management, the F-Secure and Microsoft management 
products were used in the thesis. 
1.3 Research methods 
Choosing the research method for this study proved to be quite difficult. As the 
assigner wanted to have a practical implementation on KATAKRI requirements 
against Windows 10 workstations, a decision was made to carry out a case-study in 
the form of proof-of-concept. The main research questions were: 
- Can statistically proven mitigation strategies (The Australian Signals Directive, 2012) 
be used to answer the criteria defined in KATAKRI 2015, targeting end-point 
workstations? 
- Can the new security features of Windows 10 operating system give any additional 
value for the mitigation strategies? 
- How implement the above two in practice? 
2 Basis for the study 
2.1 About information security in general 
Information security can be illustrated as a confidentiality, integrity and availability 
(CIA) triangle (Figure 1). According to Easttom (2012), CIA stands for confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. Confidentiality is used to make sure that only authorized 
users have access to the information, integrity is for ensuring that only authorized 
users can modify the information and availability is for ensuring that the information 
is accessible to the authorized users when it is requested (Kim & Solomon, 2014, 
414). 
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Figure 1. CIA triangle 
2.2 Security controls and auditing 
As noted by Kim & Solomon (2014, 232-233), security controls address a risk that 
might be targeted to the organization in case. These controls should be maintained 
so that they are effective and current.  Reviewing the effectiveness and continuous 
improvement can be illustrated in a security cycle (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Security cycle 
 
To protect business assets and mission from the risks they face is the main purpose 
of information security. Maintaining information systems and making sure that 
security controls work as expected, security audits can be conducted for verifying 
them. The implementation of security controls should be done so that they address 
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the actual risks and not just because of security itself (Kim & Solomon, 2014, 231-
232).  
2.3 National Security Auditing Criteria – KATAKRI 
KATAKRI is a Finnish auditing tool used to determine an organization’s capabilities to 
secure government officials classified information. KATAKRI auditing criteria do not 
give implicit requirements, instead they are based on existing Finnish legislation and 
international regulations for information security obligated to the Finnish 
government. The principal source for KATAKRI’s requirements is the Finnish 
government’s regulation of information security in national government authorities. 
It also refers to other commonly known standards such as ISO 27000. The 
requirements in the criteria are divided into three different areas: security 
management (T), physical security (F) and information assurance (I). The 
requirements of the information assurance section can be fulfilled according to the 
three Finnish national protection levels IV, III and II which are equal to the 
international levels of classification: RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTAL and SECRET. 
(Ministry of Defence, 2015, 3-4).  
The current publication of KATAKRI is the 3rd version, also known as KATAKRI 2015. 
The most significant change in the criteria between earlier releases is the focus on 
risk-based evaluation, which can be reflected to the ones in ISO 27001 (Nixu, N.d.). 
KATAKRI 2015 is used in this thesis.  
 
2.4 Top four strategies to protect ICT systems 
The Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) (2012) has created top four strategies to 
mitigate against threats targeted at ICT systems. The strategies are based on the 
analysis of known intrusions techniques. These top four mitigations are: application 
whitelisting, allowing only the needed applications to be run on the target machine; 
patching applications, running the latest versions of the software; patching operating 
systems, using the latest versions and minimizing administrative privileges.  
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2.4.1 Application whitelisting 
According to Sedgewick, Souppaya & Scarfone (2015, 2), a whitelist is a discrete list 
of entities such as applications that are authorized to be present or active on a host 
according to a defined baseline. Whitelisting of applications is intended to stop the 
execution of unauthorized software, for example malware. The concept of 
application whitelisting is the opposite of blocking malicious files, instead whitelisting 
only permits to run known good executables on the target system. This can be 
achieved by creating a list of known file hashes and allowing the running of those 
files only on the target system (Beechey 2010, 3). Limiting what to run on gives 
administrators more control on what is happening in the environment. 
 
2.4.2 Application and operating system patching 
Flexera Software’s Vulnerability Review (2016) research based on more than 50 000 
applications, operating systems and appliances reveals that in the year 2015, 79% of 
software vulnerabilities affected non-Microsoft applications. The same report also 
shows the increase in vulnerabilities in all Microsoft Windows operating systems. 
Notable here is that Flash player is bundled with Windows 8 and Windows 10, thus it 
is added to the overall vulnerability count, which causes the increase in 
vulnerabilities against Windows 7 (Figure 3). As can be seen, the overall trend of 
vulnerabilities in Windows operating systems is rising. 
 
Figure 3. Vulnerabilities in Windows operating systems (Flexera Software, 2016) 
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According to Kim & Solomon (2014, 214), an organization must have a working 
process for handling patch-management so that all known vulnerabilities are 
addressed without causing any system outages. The patches should be reviewed and 
tested before the actual roll-out to make sure that they will not disable the 
functionality of working systems. 
 
2.4.3 Minimizing administrative privileges 
As noted by the Australian Defence Signals Directorate (2012), a usual target for an 
attacker is a user account with administrative privileges. Because administrators 
have high level access to the organization’s systems, if these accounts are 
compromised, the attacker can have access to any data that the administrator can.  
Restricting administrative privileges makes the doings of malicious code more 
difficult. An environment where privileges of the administrators are restricted 
becomes more stable, predictable, easier to administer and support because of the 
fact that only few trusted users can make changes to the operating environment 
(Australian Cyber Security Centre, 2016). A research made by Avecto (2017) reveals 
that 93% of critical Windows 10 vulnerabilities could be mitigated by removing 
administrative rights. Avecto’s research was based on an analysis of security bulletins 
released by Microsoft in 2016.  
 
3 Technology background 
Windows 10 was the main target on the technology choices. As some of the 
technologies used by the assigner were already selected based on Microsoft 
Windows, a decision was made to make use of the existing and add something that 
has been proven to add value for the overall security. Metcalf (2016) describes that 
for the creation of a secure Windows end-point, the deployment of free Microsoft 
provided tools like Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) and Local 
Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) are required to increase the overall security 
of the system. 
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3.1 Windows 10 operating system and its security features 
Windows 10 offers built-in security features such as the Windows Defender and most 
notably it is an advanced threat protection component (only offered to enterprise 
business customers). This chapter focuses mainly on the features that are not cloud-
based since the limitation of proof-of-concept was the isolation of the Internet. As 
the technology choices for some parts of the implementation were driven by the 
assigner, the usage of antimalware solutions built into Windows 10 are not properly 
addressed here. 
 
3.1.1 About different Windows 10 editions 
Windows 10 operating system has four different versions or editions; Home, Pro, 
Enterprise and Education. From these the Pro and the Enterprise versions are 
targeted at business users. The Pro version lacks the security functionalities e.g. 
Device Guard, Credential Guard and AppLocker (Howse 2015) as well as disabling of 
Microsoft’s data collection features. A more specific comparison of the features 
between each version can be found in Appendix 1.  
 
3.1.2 Privacy concerns 
Microsoft has publically admitted that its newest operating system, Windows 10, 
collects information about the user activity of the operating system. Exactly what is 
collected and sent back to Microsoft remains unknown. What is known, or at least 
most people suspect is that the data collected is used for profiling users for targeted 
advertisements. Microsoft says that the information is used to improve the user 
experience for the operating system (Sebastian 2015).  
Most people do not even bother to read end-user license agreements and can 
therefore accept to act without even thinking what it actually means. Configuring 
what data is allowed to send is scattered in different places in the operating system, 
which also makes it much more difficult for the users to control. According to blog 
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post by Kelly (2015), Microsoft’s corporate vice president Joe Belfiore has admitted 
that the end-users cannot control every data collecting feature of the operating 
system. 
 
3.1.3 Changes in operating system updates  – Windows as service 
With Windows 10, Microsoft changed its approach dramatically on how the 
operating system is kept up to date. In earlier Windows operating systems there 
would be multiple individual patches that address certain security issues or bugs. As 
described by Mercer (2016a), some Microsoft customers would selectively choose 
what updates to install and that lead into problems such as complexity of testing 
those updates and different combinations of updates causing errors. The overall 
situation of selectively patching is illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4. Illustration of selective patching in Windows OS. 
 
When Windows 10 was launched, it introduced the new way of monthly patching, a 
cumulative approach. Each month there is only one software update to be delivered, 
including all the security updates and other fixes for that month, which are called 
quality updates. This way the operating system is always kept at certain level, even if 
the administrator forgot to deploy patches in some month. As of October 2016, 
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Microsoft introduced this same approach for lower-level operating systems starting 
with Windows 7 (Niehaus 2016).  
Another big change Microsoft introduced with Windows 10 is the way the new 
operating system features are delivered to the end-users. Traditionally, a new 
version of Windows operating system was released every 3 to 5 years. Although 
Microsoft is marketing Windows 10 as the last version of Windows, these feature 
updates are actually new build versions of the operating system. At the time of the 
writing, there have been three major version releases (or feature updates) of the 
operating system. The versions are labeled as the year and month they were 
released, which can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Windows 10 release information. (Microsoft Technet, 2016). 
Servicing option Version OS build Availability date 
Current Branch (CB) 1703 15063.296 11.4.2017 
Current Branch (CB) 1607 14393.1198 2.8.2016 
Current Branch (CB) 1511 10586.916 12.11.2015 
Current Branch (CB) 1507 (RTM) 10240.17394 29.7.2015 
Current Branch for Business (CBB) 1607 14393.1198 29.11.2016 
Current Branch for Business (CBB) 1511 10586.916 8.4.2016 
Current Branch for Business (CBB) 1507 (RTM) 10240.17394 29.7.2015 
Long-Term Servicing Branch (LTSB) 1607 14393.1198 8.2.2016 
Long-Term Servicing Branch (LTSB) 1507 (RTM) 10240.17394 29.7.2015 
 
As described by Halfin (2016) these new versions of Windows 10 are called feature 
updates. The delivery time (Figure 5) of each version is divided into different 
branches, which are basically a release cycle of builds for Windows 10 targeted for 
different audiences of the operating system: 
- Insider or preview branch feature updates are the ones that are targeted at only 
those who want to test out the new features of the operating system before they are 
released for a broader audience. Basically this is a pre-version of the operating 
system. 
 
- Current Branch (CB) feature updates are delivered as soon as Microsoft releases 
them, these would be the ones that normal home users get. Only one CB version is 
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supported by Microsoft at a time. The new current branch version is delivered every 
4 to 6 months. 
 
- Current Branch for Business (CBB), is targeted for business users. Basically these are 
the same versions that were released as CB. CBBs are released about four months 
after CB and are supported by Microsoft for business users. Two CBB builds, plus 60-
day grace period are supported by Microsoft at a time. To stay supported by 
Microsoft, administrators need to upgrade these versions of Windows 10 builds to 
new ones in about every 1 and half to 2 years. 
 
- Long-term Servicing Branch (LTSB), is targeted for specialized systems and only 
receive quality updates. New LTSB versions are released every 2-3 years and are 
supported by Microsoft for a 10-year life cycle.  
 
 
Figure 5. Time vs. Windows 10 servicing branches. 
 
Microsoft markets the LTSB branch as only designed for mission-critical devices 
where it is more important to keep devices as stable and secure possible. The usual 
marketing punch-line is that, if there’s a Microsoft Office installation on the 
computer, it should not run the LTSB version. LTSB comes only with the Enterprise 
edition features, so it has all the same security features as the standard Enterprise 
version of Windows 10. What really differs LTSB from other branches is the fact that 
it actually lacks some of the major features of Windows 10 that might not suit 
businesses. These features include Store, Cortana and Microsoft Edge browser as 
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well as the built-in modern apps (Camera, Calendar, Calculator, Weather, News…) 
however it can run still these modern apps just like any other Windows 10 version 
(Hoffman 2016). 
 
3.1.4 Malware resistence - Windows Defender ATP 
Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP) is a major feature of Windows 
10, as described by Savill (2016), it is “a post-breach solution that aims to be the 
black box flight recorder to enable forensic analysis of exactly what happened”. This 
includes an answer to questions when, where and what exactly happened. 
Technically Windows Defender ATP sends data from the Windows operating system 
to the cloud where it is analyzed and enables the administrators to track the entire 
security breach timeline, nicely visualized through dashboards. As Kaelin (2016) 
explains, this kind of technology sounds good; however, the businesses need to give 
Microsoft access to the data in their environments, which might not be acceptable 
for everyone.  
 
3.1.5 Biometric user authentication – Windows Hello 
As described by Decker (2017), Windows Hello is a built-in biometric authentication 
feature of Windows 10. It lets the end-users to use their face or fingerprint for 
authentication instead of traditional username / password –pair. The biometric data 
is always stored locally on the device so there is no built-in centralized management 
solution, such as for example Active Directory, available at the time of this writing. 
Both facial and fingerprint recognition require Windows Hello certified hardware. 
The fingerprint sensor requires anti-spoofing measures implemented by the 
manufacturer and facial recognition cameras must use IR light, so that they can tell 
the difference between a living person and a photo while used. Facial recognition 
sensors must also have anti-spoofing measures implemented. 
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3.1.6 Information protection – BitLocker and WIP 
BitLocker is a built-in disk volume encryption solution Microsoft has shipped since 
Windows Vista. It uses a Trusted Platform Chip (TPM) to detect unauthorized 
changes in the PC hardware and if changes are detected, read access to the secrets 
stored in the chip are denied. (Paul 2016). BitLocker also supports two-factor or even 
three-factor authentication when used with TPM + PIN or TPM + PIN + USB-key for 
unlocking the encrypted hard drive.  
Microsoft (2005) describes TPM chip as "a microcontroller that stores keys, 
passwords and digital certificates." Access to this confidential information can be 
denied if the boot sequence of the computer is not as expected. Windows 8 
introduced another technology called Secure Boot, which basically allows only 
authorized boot loaders to run when the PC starts. Secure Boot requires Unified 
Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) which replaces or works in conjunction with the 
legacy Basic Input Output System (BIOS). UEFI works as an interface between the 
operating system and the PC (Microsoft N.d.). BitLocker Using Secure Boot with 
BitLocker adds additional security to the overall configuration as no other but 
digitally signed bootloaders are allowed to be used in the system. Windows 10 
introduced a few new features to the BitLocker platform compared to the older 
Windows versions; most notably the XTS-AES encryption algorithm support and DMA 
protection which can be used when the device is locked or starting up (Hakala 2017). 
BitLocker has been proven to be vulnerable to certain types of attacks: coldboot, also 
known as the Princeton attack being one of them (Appelbaum 2008). In a coldboot 
attack, the memory chips of the target machine are frozen, removed from the target 
and attached to another computer or specialized hardware to get the crypto keys out 
of them and use then that information to unlock the BitLocker encrypted hard drive. 
This kind of attack against the technology is plausible; however very unlikely, 
especially if the target machine resides in physically safe perimeter. A more likely 
attack method against BitLocker is to use direct memory access (DMA), where the 
crypto keys are stolen from the target machine through accessible high-speed 
extension port, such as FireWire (Panholzer 2008).   
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Windows information protection (WIP) is a new feature introduced in Windows 10 
version 1607. This feature is designed to prevent accidental data leakage and to 
provide a seamless user experience for dividing personal and company data. Mercer 
(2016b) describes that the technology enables the administrators to configure a set 
of policies for company devices and the applications running on them, so that the 
end-users, or the company, can control which data is saved as personal. Smith (2016) 
explains that this feature also includes the restrictions for copy-paste actions, where 
users cannot paste company data to another application which is not configured as 
managed. A good example of this could be pasting data from company confidential 
document to a web browser. The use scenario for this feature is more likely on bring 
your own device (BYOD) type of scenarios where end-users are using their own 
equipment for doing their work. 
 
3.1.7 Identity and access control - Credential Guard 
Credential Guard is a new technology in Windows 10, and it isolates the user 
credentials from the local memory to a stored virtual container that the operating 
system cannot directly access. As described by Khanse (2016), the credential guard of 
Windows 10 increases the overall security of the domain credentials and hashes.  
This technology can only be used to protect domain credentials from common tools 
such as Mimikatz to prevent the stealing of them from the computer's memory; it 
does not provide additional security for local accounts on a Windows machine. The 
credential guard requires a 64-bit processor, processor virtualization extensions and 
extended page tables (VT-x for Intel, AMD-V and Second Level Address Translation 
a.k.a. SLAT), TPM and UEFI with Secure Boot feature enabled (Lich 2017). Modern 
PCs have the technology required for this technology to work out of the box. 
 
3.1.8 Malware resistance – AppLocker and Device Guard 
Windows AppLocker introduced in Windows 7 is a successor of Software Restriction 
Policies feature. AppLocker can be used by administrators to control how and what 
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standard users can run on the Windows operating system. AppLocker covers 
executable files, scripts, DLLs and Windows installer files. Rules can be defined based 
on attributes of the files, e.g. path, file name, version or digital signature. Targeting 
of the rules can be done with the help of security groups in either local computer or 
Microsoft Active Directory. Exceptions for different users or groups for the rules can 
also be made. (Microsoft TechNet Library, N.d.a). 
Graeber (2016) describes Windows Device Guard as "a powerful set of hardware and 
software security features available in Windows 10 Enterprise and Server 2016 that 
aim to block the loading of drivers, user-mode binaries, Microsoft Installer (MSI) and 
scripts that are not explicitly authorized per policy. In other words it is a whitelisting 
solution. The idea, in theory, being a means to prevent arbitrary unsigned code 
execution."  
Windows 10 devices configured with Device Guard do not allow running anything 
else than what is allowed, so it provides better security against zero day exploits and 
malware. Device Guard requires a 64-bit CPU, hardware virtualization extensions, 
UEFI with Secure Boot enabled and Hypervisor Code Integrity (HVCI) compatible 
drivers to work correctly (Microsoft, 2017). HVCI is used to determine whether the 
executed code in Windows kernel mode is securely designed and trusted. In general, 
virtualization-based security (VBS) is an overall solution for Windows 10 to isolate 
core operating system services (Hakala 2016). The same requirements apply to the 
earlier described Credential Guard feature. 
The main difference between AppLocker and Device Guard is that AppLocker can be 
used to further adjust based on the file path, running user or group, i.e. what exactly 
is allowed to run. Device Guard works system-wide and doesn't care about the file 
location or the user running the code; this way Device Guard prevents malicious code 
from running by administrators or the system account itself.  
 
3.2 Active Directory Domain Services and group policies 
As described by Dubey (2016), Active Directory (AD) “provides a centralized solution 
for managing users, verifies the identity of users and authorizes resources on each 
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access”.  Active Directory is a widely-used technology in Windows based computer 
system environments. 
Computers in an Active Directory domain can be managed through Group Policy 
Objects (GPO). Hoffman (2012) explains the Group Policy as a Windows feature that 
can be used to adjust settings for computers and users in an Active Directory Domain 
environment. Policies can be used to control what is allowed and what is not allowed 
for an end-user on a Windows operating system. Group Policies can also be used to 
automate administrative tasks in the environment. 
 
3.3 Local Admin Password Solution 
The Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution is a group policy client-side 
extension enabling organizations to securely rotate the local administrators’ 
passwords on Windows operating systems. Technically, the passwords are stored in 
the Active Directory object of the computer account, this enables more granular 
control on who are allowed to read the password for each device (Beckman 2015). 
According to Penshorn (N.d.) LAPS significantly lowers the risk of pass-the-hash 
attacks in Active Directory environment, since the solution configures a different 
password for the administrator account on each device. This way if one device is 
compromised, the attacker doesn't gain access to other devices using the stolen 
password. Penshorn (N.d.) also points out that since the solution stores passwords as 
a clear text into Active Directory, misconfiguration may cause a critical security issue, 
thus the solution should be configured carefully. 
 
3.4 System Monitor 
System Monitor (Sysmon) is a freeware tool part of Sysinternals Suite, offered by 
Microsoft that extends the standard Windows event log with logging activity of 
process creations, network connections with involved processes, changes in the file 
system and generates events from early stages of the boot process to capture 
malicious activity (Perez, 2014). As mentioned by Russinovich (2016), built-in 
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Windows operating system logging functionality lacks the information captured for 
Dynamic Link Library (DLL) loading and process creation, as well as network 
connection information. 
Events generated by Sysmon can be used to track which process initiated which 
network connection to what destination as well as tracking down which child process 
was started by another process. This information is useful while gathering evidence 
of malicious activity in the environment. 
 
3.5 Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit 
Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) is a freeware tool offered by 
Microsoft to address 0-day vulnerabilities by using the built-in Windows security 
defenses such as address space layout randomization (ASLR) and data execution 
prevention (DEP). As described by Krebs (2013), “DEP is designed to make it harder 
to exploit security vulnerabilities on Windows and ASLR makes it more difficult for 
exploits and malware to find the specific places in a system’s memory that they need 
to do their dirty work.”  
As statistically proven by Niemelä (2013) system hardening by itself is not effective 
mitigation against advanced persistent threat (APT) –based attacks. Instead, adding 
additional controls that can handle application memory, such as EMET, is effective. 
Furthermore, according to Dormann (2016), Windows 10 capabilities to mitigate 
against threats without EMET are not as effective as they are marketed to be.   
 
3.6 Microsoft Security Compliance Manager 
Microsoft offers a free tool called Security Compliance Manager (SCM). The tool is 
used to configure and manage Group Policy objects against Microsoft operating 
systems and other products, based on the recommended Microsoft security 
baselines (Andrabi 2016). Security baselines are collections of different settings that 
impact the overall security of the product in case. According to Lich (2016), baselines 
ensure that the device in case is configured accordingly. Microsoft recommends 
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implementing industry-standard configurations that are commonly known and 
tested, instead of creating a baselines by oneself. Microsoft collaborates with the 
Center for Internet Security (CIS) to develop the baselines used with Security 
Compliance Manager (Center for Internet Security, 2013). Security Compliance 
Manager reduces the administrative effort of re-inventing the wheel by the 
administrators figuring out what controls to implement against their environment, as 
it gives clear startup points. 
 
3.7 Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager 
Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager, also known as SCCM or ConfigMgr, 
is a computer management system that is widely used in Windows environments. 
SCCM has capabilities to install applications, software updates and operating systems 
to computers as well as collect information out of them. Administrators can run any 
given command, executable or a script on SCCM managed endpoint, which gives 
major flexibility to do the tasks centralized. The endpoints targeted at different types 
of administrative tasks are gathered into collections, which can be made based on 
different set of rules, for example all the machines with Windows 10 as their 
operating system. These collections are dynamic which would mean that when the 
device in case meets the definition configured (in the managed environment), it 
would be automatically added to its dedicated collection and ready for accepting 
tasks defined by the administrator (Holt 2012). 
 
3.8 F-Secure Policy Manager and Client Security 
Finnish information security company F-Secure offers an overall solution for on-
premises malware protection. The solution consists of management server and client 
agents for both server and workstation end-points. F-Secure Policy Manager (FSPM) 
offers the malware definition updates as well as policies for managed clients, F-
Secure Client Security (FSCS) for workstations and F-Secure Server Security (FSSS) for 
servers. To update the anti-virus definitions in offline environments, the company 
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offers a separately downloadable executable which includes the latest updates for 
their products (F-Secure, N.d). The product suite also includes a device control 
functionality which can be used in Windows environments to block devices attached 
to the clients from functioning based on device classes or hardware identifiers. 
 
4 Proof of concept 
The main focus of the proof of concept (POC) was to create an environment focusing 
on the end-point workstation that had the following elements: 
- Requirements and limitations defined by the assigner 
- Addressed the top 4 mitigation strategies defined by ASD 
- Used additional technologies and built-in Windows 10 security features to face the 
mitigation strategies defined by ASD 
 
4.1 Requirements for the assignment 
The assigner’s requirements for the POC were as follows: 
- Environment shall be disconnected from the Internet, purely offline 
- Try to find practical solutions for the requirements defined in KATAKRI, with the 
focus on the workstation requirements 
- Windows 10 as the operating system running on a hardware provided by the 
assigner, acting as the targeted workstation 
- Usage of technologies already in use 
o F-Secure products as an antimalware solution 
o SCCM as the centralized end-point management solution 
- Usage of new technologies to better protect against modern threats potentially 
facing workstations in disconnected environments 
- Design the usage of administrative processes for maintaining the overall security 
these new controls produce, trying to automate as much as possible to lower 
administrative effort 
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The focus was strictly on the operating system and its features and for the POC, the 
physical security was not taken into account. The targeted workstation would be 
used purely for creating documents, spreadsheets and presentations, thus Microsoft 
Office was the only additional end-user software installed.  
 
4.2 Description of the POC environment 
The POC environment consisted of three servers:  
- Active Directory Domain Controller, DC 
- System Center Configuration Manager, SCCM 
- F-Secure Policy Manager, FSPM 
All the servers in the environment were running Windows Server 2012 R2 operating 
system. The whole server environment was virtualized using Microsoft Hyper-V using 
a laptop as the hypervisor. This approach was suitable for demoing as the whole POC 
environment was portable.  As some security features of Windows 10 require 
physical hardware to work, the client PC for the POC was also running on a laptop. 
Illustration of the environment can be seen in Figure 6. 
DAGOBAH.NET
Active Directory Domain
DC
Domain Controller
SCCM
System Center Configuration Manager
FSPM
F-Secure Policy Manager
W10LTSB
Windows 10 Client PC
 
Figure 6. Illustration of the POC environment. 
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Since the focus was only on the client PC, the servers were not configured with best 
practices. For example, no additional administrative accounts were configured for 
the AD or the whole environment. All the configuration focused on the targeted 
workstation only.  
The targeted client PC was installed using the LTSB version 2016 of Windows 10 
operating system. LTSB 2016 is based on the 1607 version of Windows 10, so the 
same configurations and features apply to that as well. The reason for choosing the 
LTSB version was quite simple: 
- It has all the same security features as the Current Branch version of Windows 10 
1607 Enterprise has. 
- It lacks the Windows Universal Apps that update themselves from the cloud-based 
Windows Store. These would not work in a disconnected environment. 
- It offered a 10 year support-period, keeping the administrative costs at minimum as 
required by the assigner 
 
Since the POC workstation was going to be used for working on documents, 
Microsoft Office 2016 was also installed to the machine. 
 
4.3 Approach on configuration of the environment 
The decision was made to test technologies behind the security controls one by one 
and explain the basics of how they worked in practice. The controls implemented in 
the POC were divided into varies of entities, beginning with configuring the client 
computer hardware to support the features described earlier. 
As the implementation had certain parts that affect each other, the controls were 
implemented in order that everything would work as expected, thus the additional 
applications were configured first, before implementing the whitelisting solutions. 
Australian Signals Directorate’s top four mitigation strategies were divided into 
different phases and are addressed in the following chapters. 
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4.4 Minimizing administrative privileges 
One of the ASD’s top four mitigation strategies was the minimizing of administrative 
privileges. As the POC environment consists of Active Directory and workstations for 
the standard users a decision to follow Microsoft’s best practice on a so-called tier-
model for administrating the environment was implemented. The tier-model consists 
of many considerations; however as the purpose for the POC was to protect the end-
points, logon restrictions (Figure 7) of the model were implemented. In short, the 
administrators administer only the things they are allowed to administer with 
dedicated accounts and dedicated workstations. Since the assigned environment was 
a small case implementation, the dedicated workstations were left out of the scope 
on the assignment.
 
Figure 7. Logon restrictions in 3-tier model. (Plett 2016). 
By default, when Windows operating system is joined to an Active Directory domain, 
Domain Admins group is added to the local Administrators group which then breaks 
the idea of limiting Domain Admins access on the workstations.  
  
29 
 
 
4.4.1 Implementing SCM’s baseline policies 
Since group policies can be used to configure Windows operating systems and limit 
the account’s privileges, a decision was made to configure it accordingly. As 
Microsoft has their own best-practice security guides, so the decision was made to 
just follow the company’s guides and configure these well-known policies to the 
environment. Microsoft Security Compliance Manager provides tested baselines and 
it also provides functionality to export them to the environment in case (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Microsoft Security Compliance Manager user interface. 
The policies offered by SCM are divided into different purposes. Some of these 
policies are targeted at the operating system and its specific features or components 
(for example BitLocker and Internet Explorer) as well as to Microsoft Office. At the 
time of writing, Microsoft did not offer a baseline policy for Office 2016 used in the 
POC, therefore the policy of 2013 version was used as a baseline for creating a new 
policy for 2016 version.  The policies were exported from the SCM and then imported 
to the POC environment’s corresponding empty GPOs with Group Policy 
Management Console.  
Since the policies were delivered to the workstation through group policy mechanism 
of the Windows operating system, designing the organizational unit (OU) structure 
needed to be made. Workstations and the end-users were placed in dedicated 
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organizational units so that the targeting of the policies would be simplified. As can 
be seen in Figure 9, policies that are effective on users and computers are targeted at 
their respective OUs. As there would also be administrator accounts in the 
environment, the policies targeted at standard users would affect the administrators 
also. 
 
Figure 9. OU structure and baseline policy implementation. 
Microsoft’s baselines do not configure logon restrictions that Plett’s (2016) 3-tier 
model suggests. To overcome this problem in the POC environment, a new Active 
Directory group called WS Admins was created. This group includes the domain user 
accounts that would have local Administrator –rights on the target workstations of 
the environment. Also, another customized computer settings GPO was created 
(W10 Admin Security) which would add this newly created group to be a member of 
local Administrators group, as well as deny local access of Domain Admins to the 
workstations through user rights assignment policies as described by Mathers 
(2017a).  
As SCM’s baseline policies do not interfere with the local administrator privileges, a 
decision was made to include Microsoft’s recommended limited configuration for 
local administrators as well (Mathers 2017b). Since User Right Assignment –settings 
are not cumulative, the customized GPO had to maintain the settings defined in the 
SCM’s baseline policy as well as the ones affecting the administrative privileges that 
were to be changed (Appendix 2). 
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One major usability setting of the SCM’s Windows 10 Computer Security policy was 
the configuration of the built-in User Account Control (UAC) feature. As described by 
Russinovich & Margosis (2016, 16-17), UAC is a feature introduced in Windows Vista 
that forces the members of the administrators group to run applications in standard 
user context and require elevation of privileges to an administrative level when 
needed. SCM’s policy configures the UAC so that standard users cannot elevate their 
privileges to an administrative level, instead the administrators are forced to log in to 
a full user session for administrative tasks on the workstation. Because of this, the 
administration of the POC workstation becomes slightly more complex from the 
standard Windows configuration where elevation of privileges is allowed. 
The process for changing the applied policies should be made so that the changes in 
the environment were not to be made by a single person but instead all the parties 
involved in the administration of the workstations. The changes would also have to 
be tested prior implementing them in to the production environment. This would 
ensure that all the administrators know what change has occurred and why. One way 
of accomplishing the administration of the policies targeted at the workstations in 
the environment would be to delegate permissions for the workstation 
administrators group. 
 
4.4.2 Mitigation against pass-the-hash attacks using LAPS 
LAPS installation consists of two parts: the installation of the LAPS client to the target 
workstation or server and configuration of the Active Directory. The AD was 
configured first. LAPS provides PowerShell module that can be used for 
configuration; this was done on the domain controller with a user account that had 
schema admin rights on the Active Directory: 
Import-Module AdmPwd.PS 
Update-AdmPwdADSchema 
This process creates two new attributes for the Active Directory schema: 
- ms-Mcs-AdmPwd which stores the administrator’s password 
- ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpiratioTime which stores the time for resetting the password 
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After the schema has been extended, the LAPS configured computer accounts need 
permissions to write on these two new attributes, so that they can update the 
information on them. Again, this configuration was done with PowerShell: 
Set-AdmPwdComputerSelfPermission –OrgUnit “OU=W10,OU=Workstations,OU=POC,DC=dagobah,DC=net” 
For limiting the reading of the newly created attributes to the WS Admins group, 
another PowerShell command was used: 
Set-AdmPwdReadPasswordPermission -OrgUnit “OU=W10,OU=Workstations,OU=POC,DC=dagobah,DC=net”-
AllowedPrincipals “WS Admins” 
Since the next step was to separate the administrative tasks in the environment so 
that the people responsible of the workstations (WS Admins) are the only ones who 
can access the local administrator account’s passwords, a decision was made to 
remove the Domain Admins right for reading the attribute containing it. This was 
done by removing ‘All Extended Rights’, permissions for Domain Admins group from 
the W10 organizational unit with ADSIEdit. To confirm the user rights for reading the 
password attribute were correctly configured, Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights 
PowerShell command was used (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Determine who has rights to read the LAPS attributes. 
GPO extensions were used to configure the LAPS. These extensions are added to the 
client during the installation. Baseline policy for Windows 10 Computer Security 
provided by Microsoft SCM had LAPS only enabled by default, however the name of 
the administrator account, password complexity and age requirements needed to be 
configured additionally.  
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The complexity and age requirements were configured to be the same as for the 
standard domain users in the SCM’s Windows 10 Default Domain Policy; 14 
characters, must meet the complexity requirements and be effective for 60 days. 
SCM’s baseline policy also disables the built-in Administrator account of the targeted 
workstation, so a new local administrator account for the workstation needed to be 
created and that same account was also configured to be the one LAPS is managing. 
This created a sort-of chicken-egg situation where one needs to have the account to 
be managed already present in the target workstations as LAPS does not create it 
automatically on the target computer. 
For retrieving the local administrator password, LAPS provides a separate application 
that can be used to retrieve the password for the targeted machine. When running 
the application with the user account that is member of the WS Admins group, local 
administrator password can be retrieved (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 11. Retrieving the local administrator password with LAPS UI. 
Decision on who can have these local administrative rights should be considered very 
carefully. Users with these privileges pose a significant risk for the overall security of 
the environment, therefore they should be trustworthy and well trained 
professionals who know what they are doing.  
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4.4.3 Securing credentials with Credential Guard 
As one of the objectives for the POC was to use new security features introduced in 
Windows 10, Credential Guard was implemented. Credential Guard protects the 
Active Directory Domain credentials on Windows 10 end-points, therefore it deals 
with a different target than the previously introduced LAPS implementation. The POC 
environment assumes that all users are Active Directory Domain users, therefore 
implementing additional controls to protect those credentials seemed to be justified. 
Credential Guard implementation started with system readiness tool provided by 
Microsoft Download Center (2017). This tool can be used to determine if the 
hardware in case is compatible with Windows 10’s Credential or Device Guard 
features. It can also be used to enable the functionality on a device that is hardware 
ready. The tool is relatively simple PowerShell script that carries out certain checks 
against the hardware by running the tool with –Capable –CG parameter. The output 
showed warnings of features that are not supported but it also showed that the 
hardware in case is indeed capable of running Credential Guard (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 12. Checking Credential Guard readiness. 
For passing the test some modifications had to be made in the BIOS: 
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- Virtualization technologies had to be enabled  
- TPM chip had to be enabled  
- Secure Boot had to be enabled  
- Full UEFI mode had to be enabled 
 
At this point of the implementation, the settings were configured manually. For 
actually enabling the Credential Guard, the same tool was used with parameter –
Enable –CG which would also need a reboot of the machine. The tool adds registry 
keys that are used to configure Credential Guard and enables Hyper-V virtualization 
feature of Windows operating system. These same registry keys would be configured 
in the POC environment with the Credential Guard group policy provided by the 
SCM.  
To see if the Credential Guard was actually working, a check was made with Mimikatz 
before the implementation of Credential Guard (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. Using Mimikatz to retrieve password hash. 
As Figure 13 shows, the tool can be used to provide password hash for a domain user 
account. After the Credential Guard implementation, Mimikatz was used again to see 
if the hashes were still accessible. Figure 14 shows how Credential Guard works as 
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expected and the hash is not accessible, instead the tool shows that the hash is 
isolated and cannot be accessed straightly. 
 
Figure 14. Using Mimikatz after Credential Guard implementation. 
 
4.5 Application and operating system patching 
ASD’s mitigation strategies included the application and operating system patching. 
In the POC environment, System Center Configuration Manager would be 
responsible for delivering both application and operating system updates. SCCM uses 
Windows Server Update Service (WSUS) feature of the Windows Server operating 
system to fetch the information about which updates are available and which 
computers needing them. WSUS also has a mechanism of exporting and importing 
the update metadata manually from environment to another (Microsoft TechNet 
Library, N.d.b).  
SCCM can also be used to patch the 3rd party applications by crafting an installation 
package and a command to be executed on the managed clients. This solution 
provides a centralized management for the application and operating system 
patching. Reporting capabilities of the product can be used to determine the overall 
compliance of the managed clients.  
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4.5.1 Process of delivering Windows updates through air-gap 
As a starting point for delivering the updates, a way was needed to first get those 
updates from the Microsoft servers. This was done by installing a Windows Server 
machine that was connected to the Internet and had WSUS configured for 
synchronizing updates of the Microsoft products used in the POC environment. 
When the updates were downloaded to the WSUS server connected to the Internet, 
they would be delivered via offline media to the POC environment’s SCCM server 
(Figure 15). 
 
Internet
WSUS Server
DAGOBAH.NET
SCCM
Offline delivery for WSUSContent & Metadata
 
Figure 15. Delivering Microsoft updates to POC environment. 
 
To make sure that the WSUS server connected to the Internet, Windows built-in 
firewall configuration of the server was modified according to the documentation 
provided by Microsoft’s TechNet documentation (2014). This would ensure that the 
server was only allowed to access Microsoft’s update servers and nothing more. F-
Secure’s anti-malware solution was also installed on the server and an access to F-
Secure servers for virus definition downloads allowed as well. 
Microsoft updates delivered through WSUS server feature consist of two 
components: 
- Metadata, the information of the updates 
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- Content, the actual update files 
 
To accomplish this kind of delivery scenario, the following commands were used on 
the Internet connected WSUS server to export the metadata: 
%ProgramFiles%\Windows Update Services\Tools\wsusutil.exe export D:\WSUSContent\export.xml.gz 
This command will create a dump of the metadata offered by the WSUS server to a 
file called export.xml.gz. After the metadata export, the exported file and the actual 
update files were copied to an external USB-media: 
robocopy D:\WSUSContent E:\WSUSContent /E /B 
At this point metadata and the update files were on an external media. This media 
would then be connected to the POC environment and copied to the SCCM server, in 
its respective WSUSContent –folder. For performing the importing and 
synchronization of the updates to the POC environment, two steps needed to be 
made: 
- Run wsusutil.exe to import the update metadata to WSUS on the SCCM server 
- Synchronize the WSUS server component with SCCM 
 
For lowering the administrative effort, these steps could easily be automated with 
for example using scripts and scheduled tasks in both servers, the Internet connected 
WSUS and the disconnected SCCM server. 
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4.5.2 Deploying software updates 
Microsoft has traditionally been releasing security updates for its products on the 2nd 
Tuesday of every month, although after the release of Windows 10, this cycle has not 
always been as accurate as it has been. As the Windows 10 updates include both 
security and feature updates, there also have been some problems of the patches 
breaking functionalities of the operating system.  
The testing of the operating system updates can be a tricky thing to do, therefore a 
decision was made to build a solution where: 
- Update delivery to the environment is delayed. This approach gives Microsoft some 
time to fix or pull back the problematic updates. 
- Updates are firstly deployed to administrative computers. This would ensure they 
are working correctly before deploying them to the end-user workstations. 
A timeline was created to visualize how the update delivery and deployment process 
would work in the environment on monthly basis (Figure 16). 
 
1.5.2017 31.5.2017
23.5.2017 - 31.5.2017
New updates are
delivered to adminstrator s
workstations
1.5.2017 - 15.5.2017
Previous updates are
Deployed to end-user workstations
9.5.2017 - 31.5.2017
New updates are revised or pulled back
9.5.2017
New updates are released
23.5.2017
Delivery to the
disconnected environment
 
Figure 16. Update delivery timeline. 
After the new update release date administrators responsible for the software 
update process would have to review the updates carefully before delivering them to 
the environment. The deadline for the delivery would be one week before the end of 
the month, so that the updates could be tested in the environment for one full week 
before deploying them to the end users. For reviewing the updates, official Microsoft 
documentation would be a starting point for checking any known issues. 
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Additionally, other channels such as Twitter should be followed for any 
inconsistences with the monthly updates.  
 
To automate this kind of scenario, configuration of the update synchronization and 
automatic deployment rule (ADR) targeted at the administrative workstations would 
be created. SCCM’s synchronization of the updates was configured to take place on 
the 23rd of every month. The configuration assumed that the updates were already 
synchronized with the WSUS service and that the actual update files were already 
copied to the environment, so a scheduled task for WSUS offline import for the 
metadata was made to occur before this. All the workstations (end-user and 
administrative) would have a maintenance window configured to them through 
SCCM. This window would be on every 15th of every month between 00:00 – 06:00, 
which would give the workstations 6 hours of time to install the updates they are 
required to install. 
The updates would be configured to be required for the administrative workstations 
on every 24th day with a deadline that would be on the 15th day of the next month at 
00:00. This configuration would give the administrators roughly three weeks of time 
to install the updates for their workstations before they would be installed forcefully. 
During the first week, administrators install the updates for themselves, test them 
and remove problematic updates from the configuration if needed. On the 1st day of 
each month, additional deployment would be made targeted at the end-user 
workstations with the same deadline of 15th at 00:00; the same time as the 
maintenance window would occur. Communication with the end-users should be 
done properly, so that they would understand the whole process of automatic 
software update delivery and how they can control the installation of the updates by 
themselves without interrupting their work. 
If there were a case of delivering an update outside of the automated configuration, 
the administrator could always download the update in case and use the package / 
program functionality of SCCM to deliver this update to the end-points as soon as 
possible. An example for this kind of scenario would be the case of a 0-day 
vulnerability. This process would include the downloading of the update from the 
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Internet, delivering it to the POC environment, crafting an installation command and 
creating the actual deployment package. The same technique would also work the 
other way around. If there were a problematic update, it would be first removed 
from the automatic deployment rule and then a crafted uninstallation command of 
the update would be deployed against the affected clients.  
 
4.5.3 Monitoring the update compliance 
SCCM offers built-in reports to monitor the compliance state of the software updates 
in the managed environment. Monitoring the compliance state gives administrators 
a good view on which of the environment’s workstations are still requiring updates 
to be installed. Monitoring the state should be a monthly process for the 
organization so that actions could be taken if the state was to change from the 
targeted result.  
 
4.6 Additional controls 
The top four mitigation strategies of the ASD do not include data protection, system 
logging and multi-factor authentication that Windows 10 operating system provides 
as built-in features, however, the POC environment was configured to use these as 
well. 
4.6.1 Facing the privacy concerns of Windows 10 
As noted before, Windows 10 has the built-in features that are used for data 
collecting by Microsoft. Additional configuration of the operating system was made 
to restrict this kind of behavior. This was accomplished by implementing the 
Windows Restricted Traffic Limited Functionality Baseline (Lich 2017c), which is a set 
of group policy and additional configurations such as removing the built-in modern 
applications of the operating system. Group policy settings offered by Microsoft 
were adjusted to the baseline security policy that was already implemented. As the 
LTSB version of the Windows 10 does not include the same built-in applications as 
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other versions, there was no need for removing those. Restricted traffic baseline 
configures the operating system to minimize the unwanted traffic made by the 
operating system. 
4.6.2 Data protection, BitLocker and Windows Information Protection 
BitLocker was implemented with the simplest configuration on the POC workstation: 
use only TPM protection. This was because of the different bypass mechanisms as 
described by Laiho (Appendix 4) were implemented. To protect against DMA –
attacks, hardware device classes were blocked with F-Secure Client security as will be 
described later. Also, a registry setting Laiho (2017) provides in his blog post was 
used to protect Windows 10 (version 1607 which the LTSB 2016 is based on) against 
these attacks when the computer is in logon screen: 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\PnP\Pci 
o DisableExternalDMAUnderLock (DWORD) = 1 
Besides these configurations, the SCM’s default BitLocker policy was changed from 
the default that it uses the newest XTS-AES 256 algorithm for encrypting the 
removable drives also. This would mean that the encrypted removable device is 
usable only on Windows 10 operating systems because the encryption algorithm is 
not supported in the earlier versions of Windows. Secure Boot was also enabled on 
the POC workstation, as it already was the case while implementing Credential Guard 
earlier. SCM’s default configuration for BitLocker (Win10-1607 BitLocker Security) 
enables Secure Boot integrity validation, which means that the operating system only 
loads firmware that is trusted. Policy also configures removable devices so, that it 
disables write-access to them, if they are not encrypted. This would ensure that the 
data going out of the POC environment is always encrypted. 
Windows Information Protection feature was tested briefly, however quickly turned 
out that the technology is not really usable in a small-sized disconnected 
environment. Another point was that if it was truly meant to be used, a public key 
infrastructure (PKI) would had to be in place, which was not the case within the 
targeted environment. The feature can be deployed through SCCM, however, at the 
time of the writing, support for Microsoft Office 2016 products was missing. 
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4.6.3 Implementation of biometric authentication 
Windows 10’s built-in feature of Windows Hello offers the opportunity to use 
biometric authentication as a part of POC. The only drawback comes from the 
centralized management point of view. Technically the biometric data is stored on 
each individual device and thus it is not replicated between Active Directory servers. 
This leads to manual process of the administrators to handle while they give away 
the computer to end-users: 
- Administrator delivers a computer to the end-user 
- User’s fingerprint is scanned and attached to the Active Directory account on the 
delivered computer 
 
Bio-key’s (N.n.) EcoID fingerprint reader was used in the POC environment to test 
this kind of scenario as the device offers full support for Windows Hello. The first 
problem was that the policy (Win10-1607 Computer Security) offered by SCM breaks 
the functionality of Windows Hello. To fix this problem, the Turn on convenience PIN 
sign-in setting had to be enabled and the following registry entry had to be made 
 HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System 
o AllowDomainPINLogon (DWORD) = 1 
This allowed the PIN logons in Active Directory domain environment and therefore 
would allow the usage of fingerprint authentication on the POC workstation.  
As the PIN authentication had to be enabled for the device before biometrics could 
be used, this would pose a risk of end-users having simple PINs for authentication 
purposes on their devices. On the other-hand, the PIN is specific only for the device 
in case. Knowing this, a decision was made that the end-users shall not know the PIN 
they are using, instead, administrators would use a randomized number every time 
they enroll a new user with fingerprint authentication. This would ensure that PIN is 
not used in the environment as no one knows what it is. If the biometric 
authentication does not work, users can always fallback to traditional username / 
password pair which would have additional complexity and age controls as defined in 
the SCM’s policy.  
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The fingerprint reader was tested with one finger acting as the administrative user 
and another finger as a standard user. 
4.6.4 Logging and Sysmon implementation 
As described by Kim & Solomon (2014, 246), log files are useful for providing 
evidence about abnormal and normal activities on systems. The Australian Cyber 
Security Centre (2017) offers a hardening guide for Windows 10 version 1703 which 
was used as a basis for creating the audit policies implemented against the 
workstation. Security Compliance Manager’s baseline policy for 1607 version of 
Windows 10 had some of the same settings already configured so only fine-tuning of 
the settings was made to the baseline policy according to the guide.   
Besides implementing the built-in auditing features of the operating system, Sysmon 
configuration was done as well. The implementation began with simply installing the 
Sysmon service to the target workstation with a simple installation command: 
sysmon64.exe -i -h SHA1 -n 
This would install (-i) the Sysmon service configured to log SHA1 (-h) hash of created 
processes and log network (-n) activity as well. To confirm that the Sysmon logging 
was working as expected, a check in Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational log was 
made (Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17. Eventlog entry by Sysmon. 
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4.7 Application whitelisting and malware defense 
Last of the mitigation strategies introduced by the ASD was the application 
whitelisting. As this environment is disconnected from the Internet, it does not have 
the modern cloud-based detection functionalities provided by the either Microsoft or 
the 3rd party anti-malware software company’s products do use straightly from the 
cloud. From this perspective, additional controls are indeed needed to ensure that 
the environment is safe. As noted by Niemelä (2013), preventing execution of 
applications in certain paths of Windows operating system is an effective method to 
disable malware from functioning; this was taken in to the consideration while 
implementing the controls to the POC environment.  
 
4.7.1 F-Secure Client Security and Policy Manager 
One of the requirements set by the assigner was to use F-Secure products for 
malware protection in the POC. The F-Secure Policy Manager server was installed in 
the environment as well as the Client Security (version 12.31) for the Windows 10 
end-point. The main concern was how and when the antimalware definitions would 
be delivered into the environment. Since there is no Internet connection available, 
updating virus definitions produces an administrative task that had to be dealt with. 
As antimalware definitions are changed on a daily basis, the process for delivering 
the updates to the environment would have to be a daily process for administrators. 
F-Secure offers offline update (F-Secure, N.d.) to be used with Policy Manager which 
then again distributes the definitions for all the managed client systems (Figure 18). 
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Figure 18. F-Secure definition delivery for the end-point. 
F-Secure also provides a separate .txt file which includes the Message Digest 5 (MD5) 
and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1) hashes for the current fsdbupdate9.exe file as 
well as information about the definitions themselves. For additional security 
measures a decision was made to craft a PowerShell script which would deal with the 
downloading of the update definition file and check that it is not tampered with by 
comparing the file hash to the one F-Secure provides (Appendix 4). This script could 
also be used for automating the process of downloading the antimalware definitions 
when configured as a scheduled task on the WSUS server that also handles the 
Microsoft update downloads for the POC environment.  
After the definition file is delivered to the FSPM server in the POC environment, it 
needs to be run. This configuration was made with a simple Windows Scheduled Task 
that would run the fsdbupdate9.exe from a specific folder on the server. An 
administrator’s daily tasks would include the delivery of the definition file to this 
location. The Client Security settings were configured by locking the settings so that 
end-users could not for example change any of the settings made by the 
administrator. 
Another feature that F-Secure Client Security offered for the environment would be 
the usage of Device Control feature. With the feature, administrators can define 
which devices are allowed on the client. Using this technology, a decision was made 
to block devices that are known to be used in DMA attacks against BitLocker as Laiho 
(2017a) describes. Laiho’s blog post (2017a) has a list of device classes related to IEEE 
1394. 
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As one of the requirements by the assigner was to figure out how to restrict the data 
transfers from and to the POC environment, a decision was made to configure Device 
Control for this purpose. For the POC, one USB stick was allowed to work on the 
workstation. To further configure on how data might go in or out of the 
environment, a decision was made to block CD/DVD devices also (Figure 19).  
 
Figure 19. Configuration of FSCS Device Control.  
As the SCM’s default BitLocker configuration requires the external media devices to 
be encrypted before any data can be written to them, this would also affect on how 
the data is transferred out of the environment. The end result of data delivery out of 
the POC workstation requires as follows: 
- A predefined USB mass storage device 
- That the written data to external media is encrypted with BitLocker 
 
The  Device Control policy was tested by inserting a not defined USB stick to the POC 
workstation which FSCS blocked as can be seen in Figure 20.  
 
Figure 20. F-Secure Client Security's Device Control functionality. 
Since only predefined external mass storage devices are allowed, the organization 
can control to whom these devices are given. Prior to giving the USB sticks to end-
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users, they should be properly trained on how to use the devices and how to report if 
they’re lost or otherwise compromised.  
4.7.2 Implementation of Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit 
For lowering the risk that something can bypass the mitigations described earlier, 
EMET (version 5.52) was implemented on the POC workstation. The configuration 
was performed with a recommended policy that comes with the product itself; this 
configuration was loaded to the operating system during the testing phase.  
The recommended configuration applies protection to a defined list of commonly 
used applications, including Microsoft Office and Internet Explorer, which were a 
part of standard configuration of the POC workstation. 
For testing EMET’s mitigations, SurfRight’s (2015) HitmanPro.Alert Exploit Test Tool 
was used. The tool is capable of demonstrating different exploit techniques. 
Although it was developed for testing SurfRight’s another product, it can be used for 
testing other products as well. EMET was tested so that the SurfRight’s tool was used 
to inject malicious code into iexplore.exe which was part of the EMET configuration. 
As can be seen in Figure 21, EMET worked as expected and crashed the Internet 
Explorer process. 
 
Figure 21. EMET blocking malicious activity. 
 
4.7.3 Configuring Device Guard 
Since AppLocker policies are only enforced in the user-mode of the Windows 
operating system, Device Guard was used to enforce the overall mindset of trusting 
only the things known to be trusted, thus even the administrator of the system 
cannot bypass those settings. The process of deploying a working Device Guard 
policy is illustrated in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22. Process of creating Device Guard policy. 
To prepare the POC workstation for Device Guard, the same tool that was used 
earlier for Credential Guard was also used here. Both technologies also require the 
same virtualization technologies to be enabled on the hardware prior to the 
implementation. 
For the initial configuration a decision was made to use PCACertificate file rule level 
and to include user mode executables in the policy. Lich (2017b) defines the 
PCACertificate level: “Adds the highest available certificate in the provided certificate 
chain to signers. This is typically one certificate below the root certificate, because the 
scan does not validate anything beyond the certificates included in the provided 
signature (it does not go online or check local root stores)”.  This would ensure that 
the trusted code signers on the machine at the time of the initial scan would be 
trusted and therefore allowed to run it.  
This initial policy was created the following PowerShell command: 
New-CIPolicy –Level PcaCertificate –Filepath C:\DG\InitialPolicy.xml –UserPEs –Fallback Hash 
The command would create a policy based on PCACertificates and if they were not 
available, filehashes would have been used as a fallback. After about an hour of 
scanning, the InitialPolicy.xml –file which was gained which would then be refined 
with the following PowerShell commands: 
Set-RuleOption –Filepath C:\DG\InitialPolicy.xml –Option 0 
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The option forces to include the User-Mode Code Integrity (UMCI) to the Device 
Guard policy, as the default option would only be Kernel-Mode Code Integrity 
(KMCI). The .xml –file needed to be converted to a binary format and copied to 
CodeIntegrity directory, again with PowerShell: 
ConvertFrom-CIPolicy –XmlFilePath C:\DG\InitialPolicy.xml –BinaryFilePath C:\DG\InitialPolicy.bin 
Copy-Item –Path C:\DG\InitialPolicy.bin –Destination C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\SIPolicy.p7b 
Prior to this, a separate GPO for configuring Device Guard was created that 
configures the path to the policy file. Virtualization Based Security (VBS) was already 
configured through Credential Guard’s group policy object which would also affect 
Device Guard implementation. 
After a reboot, the POC workstation would start logging to Microsoft-Windows-
CodeIntegrity/Operational –eventlog about how Device Guard would have acted, if 
the initial policy had been in enforced mode. At this point several tests were made to 
see, how Device Guard would act: 
- Install software updates through SCCM according to the process described earlier 
- Open and use applications such as Office, FSCS, EMET etc. to include the Dynamic 
Link Libraries (DLL) that they might require to function properly 
 
The first issue spotted in the CodeIntegrity –log was the information about how the 
policy would have blocked couple of drivers loaded by F-Secure Client Security during 
the startup of the operating system, if the policy was configured to require Windows 
Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) approved kernel mode drivers. According to the 
Device Guard documentation, the WHQL approved drivers are going to be 
mandatory in the future versions of Windows 10. F-Secure Corporation was informed 
about these findings. 
Another notice made was that some processes were also loading unsigned .DLL –files 
residing in %windir%\assembly –folder. Those files were most certainly a native part 
of the operating system itself. 
During the test of installing software updates through SCCM, it turned out that, the 
standard cumulative updates for Windows 10 operating system would’ve got 
installed just fine, however, Office 2016 updates were not. A further inspection of 
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this indicated that the Office updates are delivered in Microsoft Installer Patch (MSP) 
–format and they are unsigned. Windows Installer creates temporary files during the 
installation of these patches and these are removed after the installation, thus they 
were not present when the policy file of the audit was created. 
After the audit phase, the policy was created based on it:  
New-CIPolicy –Audit –Level PCACertificate –FallBack Hash –FilePath C:\DG\AuditPolicy.xml 
For merging the initial policy with the audit policy, another PowerShell command 
was used: 
Merge-CIPolicy –PolicyPaths C:\DG\InitialPolicy.xml,C:\DG\AuditPolicy.xml –OutputFilePath C:\DG\Merged.xml 
To get the policy into enforced mode after merging, the audit rule was removed from 
the merged xml-file: 
Set-RuleOption –FilePath C:\DG\Merged.xml –Option 3 –Delete 
After this the final policy for Device Guard was ready to be converted to the binary 
format and copied to the configured path as described earlier. Before copying the file 
in place, the computer was re-installed to the state where there were no updates 
installed at all, only the operating system and the applications that were also 
installed during the initial policy scan. 
To test the enforced policy, a test was made to manually update F-Secure Client 
Security’s anti-malware definitions by running fsdbupdate9.exe. Because this 
executable was not part of the policies, it was blocked as can be seen in Figure 23. 
Since the offline definition file is not signed at all and its hash changes daily, it would 
not be allowed to run with Device Guard at all. F-Secure was informed about this 
finding as well. 
 
Figure 23. Device Guard blocking fsdbupdate9.exe 
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As already noticed in the audit phase of the implementation, Office updates would 
have problems with our Device Guard policy. When the policy was enforced, 
Microsoft Office updates would not get installed, since the installation files it was 
using were not part of the policy; neither signed nor they were available during the 
calculation of the hash that could have been added to the policy. Device Guard 
documentation does provide a guide on how to sign unsigned binaries so that they 
would work with the technology, however, this could not be used with the Office 
updates as they are delivered through SCCM’s built-in functionalities. The guide 
could be used against other 3rd party software, however, an additional infrastructure 
(PKI) would be needed. 
Device Guard implementation was dropped at this point of the POC as it introduced a 
breakage of software updates that was considered more important, knowing that 
another whitelisting solution would be implemented anyway. Another reason for 
dropping was that the implementation of Device Guard would have a massive impact 
on administering the environment. If there were several new application 
installations, different hardware used etc., every change in either software or 
hardware would add additional administrative work to get it all working without 
breaking anything. 
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4.7.4 Using AppLocker as a perimiter 
If the Device Guard code-integrity policy had been enforced, still there would be a 
need for further filtering of what and from which paths are the end-users allowed to 
run executables on the workstation. Device Guard permits the usage of digitally 
signed trusted executables, but what if they are not wanted to be run by end-users? 
Device Guard does not address the location of the file running, thus everything 
signed and trusted is allowed to run everywhere and by anyone.  
Since the Device Guard implementation was based on ‘run-only-what-you-know-you-
trust’ basis, the approach on the AppLocker was slightly different from the 
administrative point of view. The aim was to lower the administrative effort when 
there are changes in the client computer. Instead of doing a full whitelisting solution 
as with Device Guard, a more flexible configuration was implemented instead. 
For limiting running of not trusted executables on Windows operating system, the 
first point is to figure out where the standard users have write access on the system. 
Microsoft’s freeware tool which is part of Sysinternals Suite, AccessChk (Microsoft 
TechNet, Windows SysInternals, 2017) can be used to list what permissions Windows 
groups have in different places of the operating system, for example the file system. 
Simply running accesschk.exe –w –d –s Users C:\ provides a list for directories to 
which the operating systems built-in Users group have write access (Appendix 5) on 
the C: drive of the targeted computer. The command was run after all the 
applications, and other components were installed into the system, because some 
applications might alter the default access rights defined in the operating system. 
This was also the case in the POC as F-Secure Client Security modifies certain access 
control lists (ACL) to grant write-access for standard users group under paths that are 
by default denied, for example, %ProgramFiles(x86)%. This behavior would break the 
default AppLocker rules which explicitly allow standard users to run everything from 
%WinDir% and %ProgramFiles% / %ProgramFiles(x86)% paths. This flaw was 
reported to F-Secure Corporation in May 2017 and it was fixed in the later versions of 
the product. 
For configuring the AppLocker, the default rules were generated for executables, 
windows installers and scripts. Although AppLocker does provide the ability to 
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configure rules for DLL –files as well, Microsoft does not recommend using those so 
they were left out of the implementation. After the default rules were generated, the 
file list generated by the AccessChk utility was used to configure exceptions for all 
the default rules that allow Windows local group Everyone group to execute anything 
from either %ProgramFiles% or %WinDir% paths. (Figure 24).  This configuration 
would ensure that standard Users are not allowed to run any executables, MSI 
packages or scripts from the locations they have write access to.  
 
Figure 24. Default rules for AppLocker with exceptions. 
For testing the configuration, notepad.exe from the %WinDir% -directory was copied 
to the location F-Secure Client Security’s installation folder under %ProgramFiles% 
which had the user write access granted. Trying to run the executable from there 
was blocked with the following policy as can be seen in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. AppLocker blocking excluded path. 
Configuration without packaged app rules broke the Windows 10 built-in 
functionality for opening Start Menu, Settings app, etc. so an addition was made to 
the configuration by allowing the running of only Microsoft signed .appx –formatted 
applications (Packaged app Rules). 
AppLocker configuration implemented gives administrative flexibility, for example 
when new applications are installed, they are allowed to run by default. However, 
every application installation should be reviewed thoroughly, if they alter the default 
ACLs of the file path rules defined in the policy. 
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4.8 Automating the implementation with SCCM 
The assigner had been using SCCM as their centralized management solution for the 
Windows environment and therefore it was also chosen as the management product 
in this assignment. SCCM provides ways to deliver operating systems, applications 
and patches to Windows end-points. 
The whole process of building the Windows 10 workstation began with implementing 
an operating system deployment solution with SCCM’s task sequence functionality. 
The task sequence automates the process of creating the POC workstation with the 
operating system installed with all controls that were introduced earlier 
implemented (Figure 26). During the course of the implementation, the sequence 
was modified to include every step needed for automating the installation of the POC 
workstation. 
 
Figure 26. Task sequence for the POC workstation. 
Automating the building process for the POC workstations proved to be quite useful, 
especially while testing the Device Guard functionality. The sequence also makes 
sure that the implemented controls are in place and repeatable for multiple 
computers. Although some of the configuration was made through Active Directory’s 
Group Policy mechanism, the balance between these two approaches complements 
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each other; SCCM is used to configure the hardware of the workstation, install the 
operating system and applications as well as configure the settings ready to be 
managed through Active Directory’s GPOs.  
 
5 Reflecting the KATAKRI requirements 
5.1 Choosing the KATAKRI requirements 
Since the assignment was to delimit the requirements explained in KATAKRI to only 
concern the end-user workstations, a decision was made to use only the following 
requirements of the criteria: 
 I06 – The principle of least privilege – Management of access rights 
 I07 – Defence-in-depth – Identification of actors of the information processing 
environment within a physically protected area 
 I08 – Principle of minimality and of least privilege rights – Configuration with 
dedicated system parameters 
 I09 – Defence-in-depth – Protection against malware 
 I10 – Defence-in-depth – Traceability of security events 
 I12 – Evaluation and approval of cryptographic products – Crypto solutions 
 I23 – Security throughout the information processing environment lifecycle – 
Management of software vulnerabilities 
 
The reason for choosing the requirements of the criteria was that, those can be 
reflected against standard user environment’s end-point workstations and the 
operating system laying on top of it. These requirements can also be met from the 
technical point of view. The chosen requirements also reflect the top four mitigation 
strategies introduced by the Australian Signals Directive.  
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5.2 Approach on addressing the KATAKRI requirements  
This chapter focuses on how to address the requirements using the tools described in 
Chapter 3. Some of these requirements cross paths between the previously 
explained ASD’s top four mitigation strategies, so those would be dealt here also. 
The approach on addressing how to handle certain requirements does not give a 
straight answer to the requirement defined in KATAKRI, instead real-life risks are 
used as key factors on how to lower them with real-life implementations using the 
technologies implemented in the POC environment. This assignment focuses more 
on the technical implementations, although some of the requirements are addressed 
from process of act point-of-view. 
 
5.3 Management of access rights – I06 
Requirement I06 of KATAKRI states: 
1. CIS users and automated processes shall be given only the access, privileges or 
authorisations they require to perform their tasks.  
 
2. Unauthorised modifications or other unauthorised or inappropriate handling of 
classified information is prevented through access control management and the 
appropriate use of security controls within the IT system.  
 
This requirement (and its implementation example) has the qualifications that 
concern more how organizations handle the whole process of user rights 
management.  As the POC environment focuses more on the technical aspects of 
security, this requirement is approached from that point of view. 
- Standard users are able to do what they are supposed to be doing on the POC 
workstation, create documents, presentations and spreadsheets with different 
applications.  
- Standard users cannot make any modifications to the system configuration because 
of the GPO configuration implemented.  
- Standard user accounts are separated from administrative user accounts 
- The POC workstation is configured so that the information can only be transferred in 
or out with dedicated USB mass storage devices 
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5.4 Identification of actors of the information processing environment 
within a physically protected area - I07 
Requirement I07 of KATAKRI states: 
Reliable methods to identify the actors of the information processing environment 
have been taken into use. 
Users in the environment are identified either by username and password, or with 
biometric identifier (fingerprint). Two-factor authentication is usually the standard 
for reliability, to make sure the person is who he/she claims to be with something 
they have and something they know. The implemented biometric authentication can 
be seen as a two-factor authentication: the computer the user’s fingerprint is stored 
into and the actual fingerprint itself, thus making it a reliable method for identifying 
the user. From the administrative point-of-view, the lack of centralized management 
of the users’ fingerprints will increase the IT administrator’s workload and thus might 
not be the most efficient way to handle authentication in a centralized Active 
Directory environment.  
The implementation example of the requirement further explains that the users in 
the environment shall be using individual user accounts and that all accounts are 
identified. POC environment did not define on how the individual accounts should be 
configured, one example could be the usage of an employee number or ID which 
should be individual for every user. The example also defines that the accounts shall 
be locked out after too many failed login attempts. This requirement is handled 
through the baseline policy offered by Microsoft through SCM. For protection level III 
or II, additional identification of the device should be done technically also, which 
was not the case in the POC implementation. 
 
5.5 Configuration with dedicated system parameters – I08 
Requirement I08 of KATAKRI states: 
1. Only the essential functionalities, devices and services to meet operational 
requirements shall be implemented in order to avoid unnecessary risks.  
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2. Organisation uses a procedure through which systems are installed and configured 
systematically, resulting in a hardened installation, following the configuration rules 
set by the organisation itself.  
 
3. Configuration contains only such components, services, user and process rights which 
are mandatory in order to fulfil the operational as well as the security requirements 
 
To meet these three requirements: 
1. The environment has the essential functions for the end-users to do their work. 
Although there are many security controls in-place, they are there because of the 
fact that they are proven to be affective against modern day threats. Those controls 
might pose a risk if they are not administered correctly.  
 
2. Automated process of installing workstations is implemented in the POC 
environment. Configuration rules are based on the good-known configuration, with 
minor modifications that can be justified. 
 
3. This requirement can be met in many different ways. As the operating system itself 
has plenty of components and these components talk to each other, turning off 
every single ‘not-needed’ service for example would be just overkilling. Instead, 
following the industry best practices presented a more appropriate way to handle 
the overall configuration. 
 
The whole requirement is slightly controversial. The requirement states that one 
needs to ‘meet operational requirements in order to avoid unnecessary risks’ and 
then it orders the configuration to contain only ‘components, services etc.’ that are 
mandatory to fulfil the operational and security requirements. As an IT administrator, 
the writer sees that that alone poses a risk for the overall operational functionality if 
too much of the operating system’s services, for example, are stopped.  
The implementation example of the requirement has further details about these 
configurations dealt with the usage of baseline policy offered by Microsoft. Some of 
these include the disabling of the autorun/autoplay functionality and the usage of 
password protected screensavers. The example also mentions that additional 
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security features such as DEP/ASLR/AppLocker should be used, which is in line with 
the POC implementation as they are used through both, the usage of EMET and 
AppLocker.  The implementation example also defines that the procedure of system 
installation should be carried out so that the end-result is hardened and configured 
accordingly. In the POC environment this is achieved by the automated installation 
process configured through SCCM in conjunction with the baseline policies defined 
through Active Directory. 
On protection levels II and III, the example goes further by telling that the systems 
should be configured so that the network traffic is minimized and the updates for the 
target systems in the environment are fetched from trusted locations. For the POC 
Microsoft’s own recommendations were used on how to restrict the traffic from the 
Windows 10 operating system and the software updates are delivered only through 
the SCCM server. The update source shall be considered as trusted, since the 
environment itself is not connected to any other networks and the update delivery is 
done through air-gap. The example also details on how BIOS should be configured for 
the targets. This was also done for the POC environment, although it was not the 
main focus during the implementation phase. 
 
5.6 Protection against malware – I09 
Requirement I09 of KATAKRI states: 
Reliable methods for deterrence, prevention, detection, resilience and recovery 
measures of malware are used in the information processing environment in order to 
prevent unauthorized changes and other unauthorized use of the information. 
As the POC environment is disconnected from the Internet, it does not have the 
same kind of cloud-based protection available as the connected environments would 
have. For this reason, more controls focusing on malware protection were 
implemented: 
- antimalware solution using F-Secure Client Security 
- whitelisting solution using Microsoft AppLocker 
- additional solution against 0-day exploits using Enhanced Mitigation Toolkit 
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POC environment is only thought from the technical point-of-view, thus the focus is 
more on the technical aspect of prevention, detection and resilience. The 
implemented controls worked as expected while they were tested during the 
building of the POC environment. 
The implementation example of the requirement details on how the antimalware 
solution should work in practice, which is basically just stating that the solution 
should be active and working. On protection levels II and III the example introduces 
the consideration for the usage of USB-ports or other interfaces at all. Since the POC 
environment uses Device Control feature of FSCS, this requirement shall be dealt 
with accordingly. Only known external devices (USB sticks in this case) are usable on 
the target workstations and the administrators can control which they are and to 
who they are given to. 
  
5.7 Defence-in-depth – Traceability of security events – I10 
Requirement I10 of KATAKRI states:  
In order to detect unauthorised changes or other unauthorised or inappropriate 
information handling within the information processing environment, reliable 
methods have been taken into use for tracing the security events. 
 
POC workstation uses the ASD’s auditing configuration for Windows 10, which can be 
identified as reliable since based on best practices. Additional logging is implemented 
through Sysmon. The implemented configuration can be used to trace which 
processes are responsible for network connections, who initiated them etc. as well as 
auditing of user logons and group management actions made locally on the 
workstation.  
The implementation example of the requirement focuses on the whole process of 
how the logged data should be handled, nevertheless, it also defines that the 
gathered log information should be sufficient enough to detect security breaches or 
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attempts of such afterwards. Auditing configuration provided by Microsoft’s baseline 
policy should be considered efficient enough on the operating system side to 
accomplish this. As the POC environment did not have a centralized log management 
system implemented, this requirement can only be met from a technical point of 
view for the target workstation.  
 
5.8 Crypto solutions – I12 
Requirement I12 of KATAKRI states: 
Competent authority has approved crypto solutions or products in current 
environment to the respective protection levels in order to safeguard and protect the 
information against unauthorised disclosure or loss of integrity. 
Ficora’s National Communications Security Authority (NCSA) offers a list of 
‘Encryption solutions approved by NCSA-FI for classified information’ (Ficora, 2016), 
however, in the list itself there is no mention of BitLocker. This was quite surprising, 
as BitLocker is a very commonly used technology in Windows operating systems, yet 
it still does not have a clearance of any level according to the Finnish authority. The 
requirement also refers to a list of accepted crypto solutions approved by NATO. The 
Netherlands accepts the usage of BitLocker on Windows 7 with the security level of 
NATO restricted (NATO Information assurance product catalogue, N.d.). 
The strategies implemented in the POC do met the most notable flaws of the 
technology (DMA) and try to mitigate them. As Laiho’s (2017b, Appendix 4) flowchart 
shows, the difference between the operating systems used with BitLocker is 
significantly different, thus the configuration used can be assumed to be safer than 
the one which for example the Netherlands has approved for NATO restricted level.  
The details of the requirement define that the overall threat level should be taken 
into consideration in the evaluation of the crypto products. The requirement itself 
cannot be fulfilled with the current configuration as it would need Ficora’s auditing 
for the configured disk encryption implementation.  
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5.9 Management of software vulnerabilities - I23 
Requirement I23 of KATAKRI states: 
Reliable arrangements are established for the entire lifecycle of the information 
processing environment to manage programme vulnerabilities. 
Software update process for the POC environment was technically implemented so 
that the products used in the environment would be updated at monthly basis. 
Although the delivery of 0-day patches can be a difficult task, the POC has the 
technology to achieve these goals.  
The whole vulnerability management is more about the process on how the 
administrators follow what is happening in the world at the time being and how to 
implement these changes in the environment they are responsible for. Details of the 
requirement define that on the protection levels II and III additional vulnerability 
scanning would be need to be performed in the environment on a regular basis. To 
fulfill this, additional processes and products should be implemented in the POC 
environment. 
 
6 Conclusions and further improvements 
The approach on the assignment was to focus on technical and more practical side of 
implementing security controls proved to be quite good from the learning point of 
view. The reflection of Australian Signals Directorate top four mitigation strategies 
(2012) on the practical side of things was a good starting point for building a proof of 
concept that would also answer the requirements that were given by the assigner as 
well as what was defined in KATAKRI. The top four mitigation strategies were 
relatively easy to digest for technical implementation compared to the requirements 
KATAKRI introduced. As the top four mitigation strategies are based on statistical 
results, they are proven to be effective. 
The scope of the implementation was wide, as one point was to study the new 
features offered by Windows 10 that could be used in the work. As Windows 10 was 
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a quite new operating system at the start of the writing this assignment, not much 
information was available on the subject. Microsoft’s own documentation lacked on 
some of the subjects; therefore, a decision was made to use other sources as well for 
the technology background of the work. The LTSB version of the operating system 
and its features is not very well covered by Microsoft itself. The used version of 
Windows 10 (LTSB 2016, based on the CBB 1607) does offer good features in the 
terms of security, however, as was quickly seen in the implementation, all of these 
new features are not mature enough to be used in environments such as the one this 
assignment produced. Most notably, the Device Guard feature of Windows 10 is 
fascinating from the security perspective, however, as long as the administrative 
effort is as challenging as it is during the time of the writing, I do not see it to be used 
in larger environments. Restricting the unneeded traffic made by the operating 
system was a big question mark at the beginning of writing this assignment, 
however, during the implementation phase, Microsoft started offering a solution 
that was later used in the environment. 
The overall configuration of the operating system and the environment in this case 
was challenging as several matters needed to be taken into consideration. The 
controls had to be implemented simultaneously so that they would not interfere 
with each other and could be used hand-in-hand. One example of this was the 
configuration of hardware to be used with the BitLocker feature in the most secure 
way possible by utilizing UEFI and Secure Boot functionalities. This involved the 
configuration of the group policies, the hardware itself as well as putting it all 
together to be fully automatized for the operating system deployment. Besides the 
technical configuration, additional consideration was given to the processes involving 
the administrative tasks the POC environment would introduce. Processes and 
technology have to support each other so that they work hand-in-hand correctly. 
One good example of this kind of work is the handling of the software update 
delivery in the assignment. 
Facing the requirements defined in the KATAKRI auditing criteria proved to be quite 
challenging as well. Choosing only few requirements was a good decision, since the 
work had to be narrowed down to only concern the end-user workstations. Defining 
the requirement itself and researching its implementation examples, the crafted 
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environment answers the questions introduced. The biggest surprise from the 
technological point of view was the BitLocker absence from the NCSA-FI’s list of 
approved crypto solutions, remembering the fact that Windows operating system 
has a really big market share in the PC world. As KATAKRI noted, cryptographic 
product evaluations should be conducted in a way that the overall security is 
measured. Knowing this, the whole POC environment and its other security controls 
should be evaluated by approved officials to be or not to be accepted on the usage of 
BitLocker. Some of the requirements defined in KATAKRI crossed each other a slightly 
and they could be narrowed and simplified to the way the ASD’s top four mitigation 
strategies are structured.  
The assigner’s requirements concentrated on the practical implementation as well as 
the usage of the new technologies. Besides the practical implementation, 
administrative processes were considered as was assigned. Overall, the environment 
built in the assignment can be used as an example of dealing with the requirements 
defined in KATAKRI as well as the usage of Windows 10 operating system. As the 
environment does not fully comply with the requirements, further improvements 
would need to be made. The most notable of these would be a centralized log 
management solution as well as the implementation of a vulnerability scanning 
mechanism and a process to help to evaluate the overall health of the environment 
on a regular basis. Other KATAKRI requirements should also be taken into 
consideration for an overall review of the environment like the one introduced in the 
POC.  
The implementation of the same kind of controls against other possible operating 
systems, such as Linux could be researched further. The assignment clearly focuses 
more on the technical side, so further improving the processes behind the 
technologies used should be the most important item to research.  
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Appendix 1. Windows 10 version security feature comparison.   
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Appendix 2. Admin security group policy object. 
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Appendix 3. BitLocker compromise flowchart. Sami Laiho. 2017. 
  
Open up the computer
Hibernated or 
power OFF
TPM
Princeton attack
SecureBoot ON
Princeton attack 
not possible
Removal of RAM 
is the only option
SecureBoot OFF
BitLocker Key 
compromised
DMA ON
Windows 7/8.1
BitLocker Key 
compromised
Logon name 
visible
Logon Cracked
Logon name 
unvisible
Hacker needs to 
guess the user ID 
(no lockout as 
with a password)
Windows 10
Logon name 
unvisible
Need to quess 
both id and 
password
Logon name 
visible
Needs to guess 
password
DMA OFF
Logon name 
visible
Needs to guess 
password
Logon name 
unvisible
Need to guess 
both id and 
password
USB
USB-media 
accessible
Princeton attack
SecureBoot ON
Princeton attack 
not possible
Removal of RAM 
is the only option
SecureBoot OFF
BitLocker Key 
compromised
DMA ON
Logon name 
visible
Logon cracked
Logon name 
unvisible
Hacker needs to 
guess the user ID 
(no lockout as 
with a password)
DMA OFF
Logon name 
visible
Needs to guess 
password
Logon name 
unvisible
Need to quess 
both id and 
password
USB-media 
unavailable
Have to guess the 
Recovery Key
PIN
PIN accessible
Princeton attack
SecureBoot ON
Princeton attack 
not possible
Removal of RAM 
is the only option
SecureBoot OFF
BitLocker Key 
compromised
DMA ON
Logon name 
visible
Logon cracked
Logon name 
unvisible
Hacker needs to 
guess the user ID 
(no lockout as 
with a password)
DMA OFF
Logon name 
visible
Needs to guess 
password
Logon name 
unvisible
Need to quess 
both id and 
password
PIN unaccessible
Have to guess the 
PIN or the 
Recovery Key
Standby
Princeton attack
SecureBoot ON
Princeton attack 
not possible
Removal of RAM 
is the only option
SecureBoot OFF
BitLocker Key 
compromised
DMA ON
Windows 7/8.1
BitLocker Key 
compromised
Logon name 
visible
Logon Cracked
Logon name 
unvisible
Hacker needs to 
guess the user ID 
(no lockout as 
with a password)
Windows 10
Logon name 
visible
Needs to guess 
password
Logon name 
unvisible
Need to quess 
both id and 
password
DMA OFF
Logon name 
visible
Needs to guess 
password
Logon name 
unvisible
Need to quess 
both id and 
password
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Appendix 4. Script for downloading F-Secure antivirus definitions 
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Appendix 5. List of folders users have write access to 
 
RW C:\Program Files (x86)\F-Secure\Anti-Virus\gkhsmtemp 
RW C:\ProgramData\Comms 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft OneDrive 
RW C:\ProgramData\USOShared 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSMSI 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Quarantine 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\sidegrade 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\header 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\installation_status 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\segmentation_rules 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\subscriptions 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\temp 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\aquawin32 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\avmisc 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\fsav_1100_bin 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\gemdb 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\hipsn 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\hydrawin 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\mlcwin 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\orsp-win-v2 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\aquawin32\1488140398 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\avmisc\1457957074 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\fsav_1100_bin\1485959324 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\gemdb\1487940417 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\hipsn\1487932806 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\hydrawin\1487936965 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\mlcwin\1467788443 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\browser 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\latebound 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\resources 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\resources_14 
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RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\resources_cs 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\static 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\browser\install 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\browser\install\fs_firefox_htt
ps 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\browser\install\fs_ie_https 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\latebound\BPP 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\latebound\BPP\localization 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\resources\image 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\resources_14\image 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\resources_cs\image 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\static\css 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\static\images 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-
Secure\FSAUA\content\nifbin\1486548835\static\scripts 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\content\orsp-win-v2\1432729310 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\FSAUA\segmentation_rules\FSPM.DAGOBAH.NET 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\ComputerSecurity 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\custom 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\DAAS2 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\FSAUA 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\FSAV 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\fsdevcon 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\FSFW 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\FSMA 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\fspmsupport 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\removal 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\Safe Banking 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\Setup 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\sidegrade 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\WMI Provider 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\ComputerSecurity\WSC 
RW C:\ProgramData\F-Secure\Logs\FSAV\Users 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\PlayReady 
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RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\User Account Pictures 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\DSS\MachineKeys 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DataMart\PaidWiFi 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DRM\Server 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\NetFramework\BreadcrumbStore 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\OFFICE\Heartbeat 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceMetadataCache\dmrccache 
RW 
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceMetadataCache\dmrccache\downlo
ads 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\WinMSIPC\Server 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\WwanSvc\DMProfiles 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\WwanSvc\Profiles 
RW C:\ProgramData\Microsoft OneDrive\setup 
RW C:\ProgramData\USOShared\Logs 
RW C:\Users\Default 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData 
RW C:\Users\Default\Application Data 
RW C:\Users\Default\Cookies 
RW C:\Users\Default\Desktop 
RW C:\Users\Default\Documents 
RW C:\Users\Default\Downloads 
RW C:\Users\Default\Favorites 
RW C:\Users\Default\Links 
RW C:\Users\Default\Local Settings 
RW C:\Users\Default\Music 
RW C:\Users\Default\My Documents 
RW C:\Users\Default\NetHood 
RW C:\Users\Default\Pictures 
RW C:\Users\Default\PrintHood 
RW C:\Users\Default\Recent 
RW C:\Users\Default\Saved Games 
RW C:\Users\Default\SendTo 
RW C:\Users\Default\Start Menu 
RW C:\Users\Default\Templates 
RW C:\Users\Default\Videos 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Application Data 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\History 
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RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temp 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Temporary Internet Files 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\InputPersonalization 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows Sidebar 
RW 
C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\InputPersonalization\Trained
DataStore 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\GameExplorer 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCookies 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Shell 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary 
Internet Files 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WinX 
RW 
C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\History\History.IE5 
RW 
C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.IE
5 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WinX\Group1 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WinX\Group2 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WinX\Group3 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows Sidebar\Gadgets 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Quick 
Launch 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\CloudStore 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Network 
Shortcuts 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Printer 
Shortcuts 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\SendTo 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Templates 
RW 
C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\CloudStore\Store 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs 
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RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\Accessibility 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\Accessories 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\Maintenance 
RW C:\Users\Default\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start 
Menu\Programs\System Tools 
RW C:\Users\Default\Documents\My Music 
RW C:\Users\Default\Documents\My Pictures 
RW C:\Users\Default\Documents\My Videos 
RW C:\Windows\Temp 
RW C:\Windows\tracing 
RW C:\Windows\CCM\Inventory\idmifs 
RW C:\Windows\CCM\Inventory\noidmifs 
RW C:\Windows\CCM\Inventory\noidmifs\badmifs 
RW C:\Windows\PCHEALTH\ERRORREP\QHEADLES 
RW C:\Windows\PCHEALTH\ERRORREP\QSIGNOFF 
RW C:\Windows\Registration\CRMLog 
RW C:\Windows\servicing\Packages 
RW C:\Windows\servicing\Sessions 
RW C:\Windows\System32\FxsTmp 
 W C:\Windows\System32\Com\dmp 
RW C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys 
 W C:\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS 
 W C:\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS 
RW C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color 
RW C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter 
RW C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\WCM 
RW C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System 
RW C:\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp 
 W C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Com\dmp 
RW C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter 
RW C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\WCM 
RW C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System 
RW C:\Windows\Temp\DisplayAudio 
RW C:\Windows\Temp\DisplayAudio\6.16 
RW C:\Windows\Temp\DisplayAudio\8.20 
 
 
